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The attorney-client privilege protects essential communications between 
clients and their lawyers from unwelcome and sometimes potentially ruinous 
exposure.  Reflecting its importance, observers have described the attorney-
client privilege as one of the legal profession’s “crown jewels.”1  The attorney-
client privilege applies to “(1) a communication (2) made between privileged 
persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal 
assistance for the client.”2  “Privileged persons” include the client or prospective 
client, the lawyer, agents of the client or prospective client and the lawyer who 
facilitate communications between them, and agents of the lawyer who assist in 
the client’s representation.3 
Organizational clients, like individuals, are entitled to assert the attorney-
client privilege concerning communications within its scope.4  For example, 
                                                 
 + Managing Director, Aon Professional Services, Overland Park, Kansas.  J.D., University of 
Kansas.  Opinions expressed here are solely those of the author. 
 1. John M. Barkett, Attorney-Client Privilege, LITIG., Winter 2019, at 34, 34. 
 2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. L. INST. 2000). 
 3. Id. § 70. 
 4. As countless courts have recited in opinions, the attorney-client privilege belongs to the 
client.  See, e.g., Fiduciary Tr. Int’l of Cal. v. Klein, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 67 (Ct. App. 2017); Ross 
v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 129 N.E.3d 641, 653 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. 
v. Powers, 164 A.3d 138, 151 (Md. 2017); Crossman v. Trs. of Fayetteville Tech. Cmty. Coll., 832 
S.E.2d 223, 236 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting In re Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772, 788 (N.C. 2003)); 
Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 89 N.E.3d 536, 541 (Ohio 2016); Commonwealth v. McCullough, 
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corporations can assert the privilege,5 as can partnerships,6 limited liability 
companies,7 governmental bodies,8 homeowners’ associations and other private 
associations,9 and trusts.10  Assuming that a communication otherwise qualifies 
as privileged, it does not matter whether the lawyer involved is in-house or 
outside counsel.11 
In the organizational context, a recurring problem is determining who among 
the entity’s employees speaks on its behalf, such that communications between 
the entity’s lawyers and those employees may be protected against discovery by 
                                                 
201 A.3d 221, 242 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018); In re Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 829 S.E.2d 707, 712 (S.C. 
2019); Arnoldy v. Mahoney, 791 N.W.2d 645, 657 (S.D. 2010); In re Cook, 597 S.W.3d 589, 597 
(Tex. App. 2020). 
 5. Affiniti Colo., LLC v. Kissinger & Fellman, P.C., 461 P.3d 606, 614 (Colo. App. 2019); 
Nemours Found. v. Arroyo, 292 So. 3d 6, 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); St. Simons Waterfront, LLC 
v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 103 (Ga. 2013); Harris Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Coulombe, 151 A.3d 7, 15 (Me. 2016); Frank v. Morgans Hotel Grp. Mgmt., LLC, 116 N.Y.S.3d 
889, 891 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 540 N.E.2d 
703, 704–05 (N.Y. 1989)); Hermanson v. MultiCare Health Sys., Inc., 448 P.3d 153, 159 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2019); State ex rel. HCR ManorCare, LLC v. Stucky, 776 S.E.2d 271, 282 (W. Va. 2015). 
 6. See, e.g., In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 930, 936, 939–40 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying the 
attorney-client privilege to communications with a partnership’s independent consultant). 
 7. See, e.g., Carpenters Pension Tr. v. Lindquist Fam., LLC, No. C-13-01063 DMR, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54335, at *8–12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014) (applying corporate attorney-client 
privilege law to an LLC); Montgomery v. eTreppid Techs., LLC, 548 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179–87 
(D. Nev. 2008) (reasoning that an LLC should be treated like a corporation for federal common law 
attorney-client privilege purposes); In re Haynes, 577 B.R. 711, 736–37 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2017) 
(applying the subject matter test for the privilege to an LLC); Fla. Marlins Baseball Club, LLC v. 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London Subscribing to Policy No. 893/HC/97/9096, 900 So. 2d 
720, 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding the privilege with respect to an LLC’s in-house 
lawyer). 
 8. See, e.g., Sandra T.E. v. S. Berywn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 621 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(explaining the importance of recognizing the attorney-client privilege where government agencies 
are concerned); Banks v. Off. of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, 222 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(stating that there is “no doubt that government agencies” may invoke the attorney-client privilege); 
Wood v. Superior Ct. of San Diego Cnty., 259 Cal. Rptr. 3d 798, 808 (Ct. App. 2020) (“It is well 
settled that a public entity enjoys an attorney-client relationship with its lawyers and the attorney-
client privilege protects communications made in the course of that relationship.”); Affiniti Colo., 
461 P.3d at 614 (noting that the “privilege applies to . . . public entities”); Suffolk Constr. Co. v. 
Div. of Cap. Asset Mgmt., 870 N.E.2d 33, 38 (Mass. 2007) (stating that qualifying communications 
between governmental entities and their counsel are protected under standard attorney-client 
privilege rules); Nelson v. City of Billings, 412 P.3d 1058, 1068 (Mont. 2018) (stating that the 
attorney-client privilege “protect[s] governmental agencies and employees like any other party to 
civil litigation”); Paxton v. City of Dall., 509 S.W.3d 247, 260 (Tex. 2017) (explaining the 
importance of the privilege in the governmental context). 
 9. See, e.g., Fouts v. Breezy Point Condo. Ass’n, 851 N.W.2d 845, 849–50 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2014). 
 10. Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg, 299 P.3d 1058, 1066–67 (Utah 2013). 
 11. FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 892 F.3d 1264, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2018); 
Cormack v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 392, 397 (Fed. Cl. 2014). 
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the organization’s adversaries and other third parties.12  And, of course, as 
organizations experience the inevitable turnover in their workforces, another 
issue surfaces: when, if ever, does the attorney-client privilege attach to 
communications between the organization’s lawyers and former employees of 
the organization?  This Article strives to answer that question. 
Looking ahead, Part I of this Article outlines the tests that courts apply when 
analyzing attorney-client privilege claims involving organizational clients.  
These tests, which control the privilege determination when current employees 
of the organization communicate with lawyers for the organization, provide the 
foundation for analyzing privilege claims where former employees are 
concerned.  Part II examines the three approaches that courts have taken when 
deciding whether lawyers’ communications with a client’s former employees 
should be protected by the attorney-client privilege.  In doing so, it discusses the 
leading case supporting each approach.  Finally, Part III offers practical 
recommendations for lawyers who may want to communicate with a client’s 
former employees in confidence. 
I.  ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENTS AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
Courts have historically applied two tests to analyze organizational attorney-
client privilege claims: the “control group” test and the “subject matter” test.  
Some courts have adopted a third test that closely tracks the subject matter test,13 
often called the “modified subject matter test.”14  The hierarchical control group 
test has largely been replaced by the subject matter tests, although a few courts 
do still employ the control group approach to the privilege.15 
A.  The Control Group Test 
Once a leading corporate attorney-client privilege test, the control group test 
appears to have crystalized in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric 
Corp.16  The Westinghouse Electric court reasoned that if the employee 
                                                 
 12. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 88 (D. Del. 1962) 
(“While [attorney-client privilege] rules may be simply stated, the problem of applying them when 
a corporation is involved is quite difficult. . . . Who speaks for the corporation? Are the statements 
of all the employees the statements of the client?”). 
 13. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935–36 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 14. See, e.g., Baisley v. Missisquoi Cemetery Ass’n, 708 A.2d 924, 931 (Vt. 1998) 
(“Following Upjohn, two tests have emerged to define the client in the corporate context: the 
subject-matter test, and the modified subject-matter test.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Langdon v. Champion, 752 P.2d 999, 1002 (Alaska 1988) (referring to ALASKA 
R.  EVID. 503(a)(2), which “adopt[ed] the ‘control group’ test”); Caldwell v. Advoc. Condell Med. 
Ctr., 87 N.E.3d 1020, 1036 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (“In order to determine which employees of a 
corporation enjoy the attorney-client privilege when communicating with an attorney on behalf of 
the corporation, Illinois applies the control-group test.”); Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 
643, 646 (Tex. 1995) (referring to TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 503(a)(2), which implemented the control 
group test). 
 16. City of Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
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communicating with a corporation’s lawyer is positioned “to control or even to 
take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may 
take” based on the lawyer’s advice,  “or if he is an authorized member of a body 
or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the 
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer” and the attorney-client 
privilege applies.17  More succinctly, for a communication to be privileged under 
the control group test, it must be made by an employee who “has the authority 
to control, or substantially participate in, a decision regarding action to be taken 
on the advice of a lawyer, or is an authorized member of a group that has such 
power.”18  Only these employees qualify as the client for privilege purposes.19  
In short, the control group test as originally crafted essentially requires that the 
employee a lawyer communicates with be a member of senior management with 
ultimate decision-making authority for the communication to be privileged.20 
Unfortunately, the control group test limits lawyers’ ability to communicate 
candidly with mid- and low-level employees of the corporation or other 
organization, thereby restricting the lawyers’ access to potentially valuable 
information.21  These limitations, in turn, impair lawyers’ ability to properly 
advise their clients.22  In this way the control group test frustrates a key purpose 
of the attorney-client privilege.23 
Some courts, correctly recognizing that organizational decision-making tends 
to be a process and is often collaborative, have relaxed the control group test.  In 
Caldwell v. Advocate Condell Medical Center,24 for example, the court 
explained that under Illinois law, 
an employee whose advisory role to top management in a particular 
area is such that a final decision would not normally be made without 
his or her opinion, and whose opinion in fact forms the basis of any 
final decision by those with actual authority, is properly within the 
control group.25 
                                                 
 17. Id. at 485. 
 18. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968). 
 19. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT 
DOCTRINE 189 (6th ed. 2017). 
 20. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 257–58 (Ill. 1982); see also 
Garrison v. Gen. Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515, 518–19 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (determining that 
GMC’s “officers, directors, [and] department heads” constituted the corporation’s control group). 
 21. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1981) (explaining the control 
group test’s drawbacks). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See State v. Robinson, 209 A.3d 25, 46 (Del. 2019) (“The privilege was designed to 
encourage full disclosure by a client to his or her attorney in order to facilitate the rendering of legal 
advice.”); Neuman v. State, 773 S.E.2d 716, 719 (Ga. 2015) (“The privilege allows for open 
communications between an attorney and his or her client . . . thereby enabling the attorney to 
gather complete and accurate information about the client’s situation.”). 
 24. Caldwell v. Advoc. Condell Med. Ctr., 87 N.E.3d 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). 
 25. Id. at 1036 (citing Consolidation Coal Co., 432 N.E.2d at 258). 
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Thus, under this formulation of the control group test, the control group may 
extend beyond the actual organizational decision-makers.26  Even under this 
more liberal interpretation, however, the control group test does not protect as 
privileged lawyers’ communications with employees who merely supply an 
organization’s decision-makers with facts.27 
B.  The Subject Matter Test 
In comparison to the control group test, the subject matter test affords much 
broader privilege protection to corporate and other organizational clients.  Under 
the subject matter test as originally conceived, a lawyer’s communication with 
any employee may be privileged if (1) the lawyer is representing the corporation 
in his or her capacity as a lawyer; (2) the communication is intended to secure 
legal advice for the corporation; (3) the employee is communicating with the 
lawyer at a superior’s request or direction; and (4) the employee’s duties or 
responsibilities include the subject of the communication.28  Applying this test, 
the employee’s position or rank is irrelevant to the privilege analysis.29  The 
Supreme Court embraced the subject matter approach in Upjohn Co. v. United 
States,30 which is regarded as “the foundational case” on the attorney-client 
privilege in the organizational realm.31  In Upjohn, the court rejected the control 
group test in favor of a subject matter approach essentially because, as noted 
earlier, the control group test “overlooks the fact that the privilege exists to 
protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but 
also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and 
informed advice.”32 
Although the Supreme Court rejected the control group test in favor of some 
form of subject matter test for application of the attorney-client privilege in a 
corporate setting, the Court declined to formulate a specific test.33  The Court’s 
reluctance to do so has since led courts to reason that there are two forms of the 
                                                 
 26. See Mlynarski v. Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 572 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1991) (“Under the control-group test, there are two tiers of corporate employees whose 
communications with the corporation’s attorney are protected.  The first tier consists of the 
decision-makers, or top management.  The second tier consists of those employees who directly 
advise top management, and upon whose opinions and advice the decision-makers rely.”). 
 27. Caldwell, 87 N.E.3d at 1036; Doe v. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, 34 N.E.3d 652, 673 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2015) (quoting Consolidation Coal Co., 432 N.E.2d at 258). 
 28. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394–95 (1981) (sketching the 
circumstances of the communications to which the court applied the attorney-client privilege); see 
also EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 192 (describing the subject matter test as it developed prior to 
Upjohn as including the third and fourth elements listed above). 
 29. EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 189. 
 30. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394–95. 
 31. In re Gen. Motors, LLC, Ignition Switch Litig., 80 F. Supp. 3d 521, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 32. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390. 
 33. Id. at 396. 
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subject matter test.34  In any event, it is clear following Upjohn that under the 
subject matter test, however it is articulated, a lawyer’s confidential 
communications with any employee are privileged when they concern matters 
within the scope of the employee’s responsibilities and the employee is aware 
that the communications are intended to enable or facilitate the lawyer’s 
representation of the corporation.35  In this way, the subject matter test is a 
functional test with the fundamental goal of enhancing the flow of legally 
consequential or relevant information from knowledgeable people inside the 
organization to the organization’s lawyers.36 
The subject matter test is superior to the control group test because the subject 
matter test recognizes that employees outside the organization’s control group 
may know facts that are essential to the organization’s need for, or reliance on, 
legal advice.  The subject matter test also “more realistically reflects the process 
of corporate information gathering and dissemination” and how corporations 
make decisions.37  It is therefore understandable that the subject matter test has 
widely displaced the control group test. 
C.  The Modified Harper & Row Test, Diversified Industries Test, or Modified 
Subject Matter Test 
The third test, which was formulated before the Supreme Court embraced the 
subject matter approach in Upjohn, is often called the “modified Harper & Row 
test,” or the “Diversified Industries test,” after the federal cases from which it 
derives: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,38 and Diversified Industries, 
                                                 
 34. See, e.g., Baisley v. Missisquoi Cemetery Ass’n, 708 A.2d 924, 931 (Vt. 1998) 
(“Following Upjohn, two tests have emerged to define the client in the corporate context: the 
subject-matter test, and the modified subject-matter test.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., LLC v. Cieslak, Nos. 2:15-cv-01189-JAD-GWF, 
2:13-cv-00596-JAD-GWF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107457, at *21 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2015) 
(“Upjohn holds that the privilege applies to communications with corporate employees, regardless 
of their position, when the communications concern matters within the scope of the employee’s 
corporate duties and the employee is aware that the information is being furnished to enable the 
attorney to provide legal advice to the corporation.”); MGA Ent., Inc. v. Nat’l Prods. Ltd., No. CV 
10-07083 JAK (SSx), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108408, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (“According 
to the Supreme Court, the privilege applies to communications by any corporate employee 
regardless of position when the communications concern matters within the scope of the 
employee’s corporate duties and the employee is aware that the information is being furnished to 
enable the attorney to provide legal advice to the corporation.”); United States v. Ghavami, 882 F. 
Supp. 2d 532, 538–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Within a corporation . . . the attorney-client privilege 
protects communications by corporate employees to counsel for the corporation who is acting as a 
lawyer, as long as the communications are made at the direction of corporate superiors in order to 
secure legal advice and the employees are aware that they are being questioned in connection with 
the provision of such advice.”). 
 36. See John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 459 (1982) (discussing Upjohn). 
 37. EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 191. 
 38. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970). 
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Inc. v. Meredith.39  The Harper & Row and Diversified Industries courts were 
persuaded that the control group test was undesirable for at least two reasons.  
First, it inhibits the free flow of material information from employees to the 
corporation’s lawyers and thereby defeats the purpose of the attorney-client 
privilege by impairing the lawyers’ ability to marshal the facts necessary to 
properly advise their client.40  Second, it potentially dissuades employees from 
speaking with corporate counsel “in a good faith effort to promote compliance 
with the complex laws governing corporate activity.”41  These courts favored “a 
more reasoned approach” to corporate attorney-client privilege questions that 
focused on “why an attorney was consulted, rather than with whom the attorney 
communicated.”42  The Diversified Industries court thus framed the corporate 
attorney-client privilege test preferably to be applied as follows:43 
[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee’s 
communication if (1) the communication was made for the purpose of 
securing legal advice; (2) the employee making the communication 
did so at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made 
the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the 
subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the 
employee’s corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not 
disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate 
structure, need to know its contents.44 
The modified Harper & Row test or Diversified Industries test is essentially 
the subject matter test with the “need to know” element added,45 hence the 
modified subject matter test description.46  As should be apparent, the “need” 
refers to certain employees’ need for the lawyer’s advice to perform their duties 
or to act upon the lawyer’s advice for the organization’s benefit—not to the 
lawyer’s need for the information known by the employees.47 
                                                 
 39. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 40. Id. at 609. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (referring to the Harper & Row test). 
 43. As noted earlier, some courts describe the Harper & Row test or the Diversified Industries 
test as the modified subject matter test even though the test pre-dates the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Upjohn.  See, e.g., Baisley v. Missisquoi Cemetery Ass’n, 708 A.2d 924, 931 (Vt. 1998) 
(combining the Harper & Row and Diversified Industries tests). 
 44. Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609. 
 45. See S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1383 n.10 (Fla. 1994) (explaining 
that the Diversified Industries court “modified the subject matter test in an effort to focus on why 
the attorney was consulted and to prevent the routine channeling of information through the 
attorney to prevent subsequent disclosure”). 
 46. Of note, one court has credited the Harper & Row court with formulating the subject 
matter test, and stated that the modified subject matter test originated with the Diversified Industries 
court.  See Keefe v. Bernard, 774 N.W.2d 663, 671–72 (Iowa 2009) (discussing the various 
attorney-client privilege tests). 
 47. See Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 610–11 (noting that the corporation carefully 
avoided disseminating the information at issue beyond those employees immediately concerned 
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II.  THE PRIVILEGE AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENT 
A.  Background and Overview 
Courts formulated the control group, subject matter, and modified subject 
matter tests for the privilege with organizations’ current employees in mind.  The 
extension of an organization’s attorney-client privilege to former employees is 
generally traced to Chief Justice Burger’s concurring opinion in Upjohn.48  As 
noted earlier, the Supreme Court in Upjohn declined to formulate a specific 
privilege test, and it also passed on deciding whether the attorney-client privilege 
should attach to the Upjohn lawyers’ communications with former employees 
regarding activities that occurred while they were employed by the 
corporation.49  Chief Justice Burger argued that the Supreme Court should have 
created a clear standard for applying the attorney-client privilege in the corporate 
context, and he would have extended that standard to corporate counsel’s 
communications with former employees.50  If Chief Justice Burger would have 
had his way, the Court would have established 
[A] general rule [that] a communication is privileged at least when . . 
. an employee or former employee speaks at the direction of the 
management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct 
within the scope of employment.  The attorney must be one authorized 
by the management to inquire into the subject and must be seeking 
information to assist counsel in . . . (a) evaluating whether the 
employee’s conduct has bound or would bind the corporation; (b) 
assessing the legal consequences, if any, of that conduct; or (c) 
formulating appropriate legal responses to actions that have been or 
may be taken by others with regard to that conduct.51 
Of course, Chief Justice Burger did not get his way in Upjohn.  In the years 
since, courts have somewhat inconsistently extended the attorney-client 
                                                 
with the matter); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 620 (D.D.C. 1979) (“The 
privilege applies to the communication only if the employee is the source of the information going 
to the attorney or is a regular conduit for such information, or, in response, if the information is 
revealed in the attorney’s advice and the employee to whom the information is disclosed has a ‘need 
to know’ the information to carry out his own duties.”). 
 48. See Cool v. BorgWarner Diversified Transmission Prods., Inc., No. IP 02-960-C(B/S), 
2003U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20137, at *3–5 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2003) (discussing Chief Justice Burger’s 
concurrence in Upjohn). 
 49. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 n.3 (1981) (“Petitioners argue[ ] that the 
privilege should nonetheless apply to communications by these former employees concerning 
activities during their period of employment.  Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals 
had occasion to address this issue, and we decline to decide it without the benefit of treatment 
below.”). 
 50. See id. at 402–03 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“I believe that we should articulate a standard 
that will govern similar cases and afford guidance to corporations, counsel advising them, and 
federal courts.”). 
 51. Id. (emphasis added). 
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privilege to lawyers’ communications with clients’ former employees.52  This is 
particularly true when you factor in control group jurisdictions, where former 
employees, by definition, cannot be part of an organization’s control group.53 
In many jurisdictions, courts reason that lawyers’ communications with 
former employees concerning events or matters that occurred while the former 
employees worked for the organization are privileged if they otherwise satisfy 
the subject matter test or modified subject matter test.54  The privilege generally 
                                                 
 52. See infra notes 53–58 (collecting cases). 
 53. See, e.g., Barrett Indus. Trucks, Inc. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D. 
Ill. 1990) (applying Illinois law and refusing to extend the privilege to former employees). 
 54. See, e.g., In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 606 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that the Upjohn analysis 
“applies equally to former employees”); United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(quoting In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc., 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981)) (applying the 
privilege to “ex-employees”); Jacobs v. Alam, No. 15-10516, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100618, at 
*17 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2020) (applying the attorney-client privilege to a former city employee); 
Hairston v. Royal Bldg. Prods., Inc., No. 1:18cv00003, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63776, at *2–3 
(W.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2019) (following In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 606); Subramanian v. Lupin Inc., No. 
17-CV-5040 (RA) (KHP), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68776, at *5–8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2019) 
(recognizing the attorney-client privilege in the former client context, but noting that in the absence 
of a privilege log or the submission of particular communications, it could not rule); MF Glob. 
Holdings Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 232 F. Supp. 3d 558, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting 
Indergrit v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 08-cv-9361, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150565, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
31, 2016)); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Plaquemines Parish Gov’t, 304 F.R.D. 494, 498–500 (E.D. La. 
2015) (predicting how the Louisiana Supreme Court would rule); Goswami v. DePaul Univ., No. 
12 C 7167, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44249, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2014) (explaining that the 
Illinois control group test did not apply, and federal law controlled the privilege question); Gary 
Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Enters., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 1533 (BSJ) (JCF), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 54154, at *16–17 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011) (applying the attorney-client privilege where 
the former employee was deposed regarding his work while employed by the defendant); New York 
v. Salazar, No. 6:08-CV-0644(LEK/DEP),  2011 WL 13205947, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. June 23, 2011) 
(“Cason’s discussions with counsel for the DOI that occurred during the course of his employment 
with DOI and those of whose ‘nature and purpose’ was for the DOI’s counsel to learn facts related 
to this lawsuit that the defendant Cason was aware of as a result of his employment, regardless of 
when they occurred, are privileged.”); Weber v. FUJIFILM Med. Sys. U.S.A., No. 3:10 CV 401 
(JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82340, at *25 (D. Conn. July 27, 2011) (refusing to reconsider an 
earlier decision recognizing the privilege); In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 2d 761, 765 
(E.D. Pa. 2010) (“Because [the witness’s] testimony concerned matters within the scope of her 
former responsibilities with [the] defendant corporation and because her conversations with defense 
counsel may be relevant to [the] defendant’s legal strategy, her communications with defense 
counsel fall within the attorney-client privilege.”); Fisher v. Halliburton, Nos. H-05-1731, H-06-
1971, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14736, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2009) (“Richard’s deposition 
testimony and preparation for deposition almost exclusively concern[ed] events within the scope 
of his duties while working for defendants. . . . Therefore, . . . all communications between Richard 
and the defendants’ counsel are protected as privileged provided they relate to events concerning 
Richard’s duties while employed by defendants.”); Misner v. Potter, No. 2:07-CV-0330 TS, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136920, at *5 (D. Utah June 19, 2008) (“[U]nder . . . Upjohn and its progeny, the 
attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications concerning matters within the 
scope of the employee’s corporate duties whether or not they are currently employed.”); City of 
N.Y. v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., No. 06 CV 2233 (JBW), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117698, at *23 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege applies to communications between in-
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does not, however, protect communications between organizations’ lawyers and 
former employees concerning matters or issues that occurred or arose after the 
former employees left the organization.55  In the latter instance, courts treat 
former employees like any other third-party fact witness.56  Other courts hold 
that former employees generally should be treated like any other third-party fact 
witness, while recognizing that unusual factual circumstances may compel a 
different result.57  Still other courts flatly decline to recognize the attorney-client 
privilege where lawyers for a corporation or other organization communicate 
with former employees.58 
B.  Recognizing the Privilege in the Former Employee Context 
Although only a district court decision, and thus lacking precedential value,59 
Peralta v. Cendant Corp.60 is generally regarded as the leading case on the 
application of the attorney-client privilege to former employees.  In that case, 
                                                 
house counsel for a company and that company’s former employee.”); Export-Import Bank of the 
U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D. 103, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Virtually all courts hold 
that communications between company counsel and former company employees are privileged if 
they concern information obtained during the course of employment.”); Cool v. BorgWarner 
Diversified Transmission Prods., Inc., No. IP 02-960-C(B/S), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20137, at *5–
6 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2003) (citing In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 606); Miramar Constr. Co. v. Home 
Depot, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184–85 (D.P.R. 2001) (applying Puerto Rico law and reasoning 
that applying the privilege to communications with former employees was consistent with the 
underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege, but declining to stretch the privilege to apply 
to a former independent contractor of the defendant); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Medtronic 
Vascular, Inc., No. N10C-09-058 JRS CCLD, 2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 129, at *18–20 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 13, 2012) (enforcing Medtronic’s privilege because the communications with the former 
employee “relate[d] directly to ‘knowledge obtained or conduct that occurred’” while she worked 
for Medtronic); Radovic v. City of N.Y., 642 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (reasoning that 
the witness’s status as a former city employee was of “no consequence” from a privilege 
perspective); Morris v. Scenera Rsch., LLC, No. 09 CVS 19678, 2011 NCBC LEXIS 34, at *17 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2011) (relying on In re Allen, 106 F.3d at 606). 
 55. See, e.g., Salazar, 2011 WL 13205947, at *5 (“[C]ommunications between [corporate] 
counsel and [the former employee] which bear on or otherwise potentially affect the [sic] his 
testimony, like facts of which he had no prior knowledge but was informed of by counsel and advice 
on how to handle deposition questioning, are not privileged . . . .”); City of N.Y. v. Coastal Oil 
N.Y., Inc., No. 96 Civ. 8667 (RPP), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1010, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000) 
(declining to recognize the privilege where the plaintiffs wanted to inquire whether the defendants’ 
former employee had his memory refreshed by the defendant’s in-house counsel in preparation for 
his deposition). 
 56. See THOMAS E. SPAHN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT 
DOCTRINE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 126 (3d ed. 2013). 
 57. See, e.g., Infosystems, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., 197 F.R.D. 303, 306 (E.D. Mich. 2000) 
(expressing the narrower general rule and then identifying possible exceptions). 
 58. See, e.g., Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188, 1193–94 (Wash. 2016) 
(limiting the scope of the attorney-client privilege to the duration of the employment relationship). 
 59. See Vertex Surgical, Inc. v. Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D. 
Mass. 2009) (“As Judges Posner and Easterbrook have repeatedly and accurately observed, with 
characteristic bluntness, district court decisions are neither authoritative nor precedential.”). 
 60. Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38 (D. Conn. 1999). 
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Ramon Peralta sued Cendant for employment discrimination.61  His lawyer 
deposed Peralta’s former supervisor, Randi Klaber, who no longer worked for 
Cendant.62  Peralta’s lawyer asked Klaber if she had discussed the deposition 
with anyone.63  Klaber said that she had spoken with Cendant’s lawyer, Maureen 
Bresnan.64  Peralta’s lawyer asked Klaber about that conversation, but “Bresnan 
objected and instructed [Klaber] not to answer the question.”65  After taking a 
break, Peralta’s lawyer “asked [Klaber] what, if anything, she had discussed with 
[Bresnan] during the break.  [Bresnan] again objected, and instructed her not to 
answer.”66  The parties then involved the court in the dispute.67 
In a quick telephone hearing, Bresnan stated that she had a “two-way 
discussion” with Klaber in preparation for the deposition.68  Klaber reportedly 
talked about the facts of the case, and Bresnan told Klaber “about ‘the 
defendant’s position.’”69  According to Klaber, their conversation during the 
deposition break “involved her request for ‘guidance on how to answer a line of 
inquiry that she perceived may cause her problems or may be unclear.’”70  The 
parties finished Klaber’s deposition and submitted letter briefs to the court.71 
The Peralta court concluded that, under federal law, “any privileged 
information” Klaber obtained while employed by Cendant, including “any 
information conveyed” by Cendant’s counsel during that time, remained 
privileged even after she left Cendant.72  That conclusion did not, however, fully 
resolve the parties’ dispute over communications between Klaber and Bresnan 
after Klaber left Cendant.73  Thus, the court went on to explain: 
To the extent that conversations between Ms. Bresnan and Ms. Klaber 
went beyond Ms. Klaber’s knowledge of the circumstances of 
[Peralta’s] employment and termination, and beyond Ms. Klaber’s 
other activities within the course of her employment with the 
defendant, such communications, if any, have not been shown to be 
entitled to defendant’s attorney-client privilege.  If, for example, Ms. 
Bresnan informed Ms. Klaber of facts developed during the litigation, 
such as testimony of other witnesses, of which Ms. Klaber would not 
have had prior or independent personal knowledge, such 
                                                 
 61. Id. at 39. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. (noting that Bresnan only represented Cendant, and did not also represent Klaber). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 41. 
 73. Id. 
50 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 70.1:1 
communications would not be privileged, particularly given their 
potential to influence a witness to conform or adjust her testimony to 
such information, consciously or unconsciously.  Although it is not 
clear from the record of the oral argument what Ms. Bresnan meant by 
‘defendant’s position,’ to the extent these communications exceeded 
the boundaries discussed above, they are not covered by Cendant’s 
attorney-client privilege.  Further, with respect to the inquiry into Ms. 
Bresnan and Ms. Klaber’s discussions during the break as to how a 
question should be handled, they have not been shown to be entitled 
to any privilege, and opposing counsel has the right to ask about 
matters that may have affected or changed the witness’s testimony.74 
The court reasoned that it should be relatively easy to distinguish between 
lawyers’ 
privileged and non-privileged communications with former 
employees . . . if the essential point is kept in mind: did the 
communication relate to the former employee’s conduct and 
knowledge, or communication with [the organization’s] counsel, 
during his or her employment?  If so, such communication is protected 
from disclosure by [the organization]’s attorney-client privilege under 
Upjohn.75 
In extending the attorney-client privilege to former employees, the Peralta 
court might be criticized for having overlooked the Upjohn requirement that 
employees be acting at their superiors’ direction when speaking with the 
company’s lawyers for the privilege to enclothe those communications.76  But 
the Peralta court did, in fact, take Upjohn’s managerial direction requirement 
into account in holding as it did.  The Peralta court specifically noted that 
“wholesale application of the Upjohn principles to former employees as if they 
were no different than current employees” was not justified by Upjohn’s 
underlying rationale because, as a former employee, Klaber was not speaking 
with Bresnan at the direction of Cendant’s management, and she had no duty to 
furnish the information sought in her deposition.77  It was principally for this 
reason that the court limited the reach of corporations’ attorney-client privilege 
to communications that “relate to the former employee’s conduct and 
knowledge, or communications with [corporate] counsel, during his or her 
employment[.]”78  So, while it certainly is fair to disagree with the Peralta 
court’s conclusion, it is not reasonable to criticize the court for supposedly 
overlooking one of Upjohn’s essential principles. 
                                                 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Infosystems, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., 197 F.R.D. 303, 305 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
 77. Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 40–41. 
 78. Id. at 41. 
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Many courts follow Peralta.79  Other courts, however, draw the privilege lines 
more narrowly than the Peralta court did.80  And, as noted earlier, still other 
courts have simply refused to recognize the privilege in connection with former 
employees.81 
C.  A Narrower View of the Privilege’s Application to Former Employees 
Infosystems, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp. is the best-known case taking a narrower 
view of an organization’s extension of its attorney-client privilege to former 
employees.82  Infosystems involved defendant Sarla Software’s objection to the 
deposition of a former employee, Jay Raghvandaran.83  The subpoena for his 
deposition commanded him to bring various documents reflecting his 
communications with Sarla’s lawyers.84  Sarla argued that Raghvandaran’s 
communications with its lawyers were privileged.85  Relying on Peralta, Sarla 
asserted that a company’s attorney-client privilege covers communications 
between the company’s counsel and a former employee where the 
communications (1) concern knowledge obtained or conduct that occurred 
during the former employee’s employment with the company; or (2) relate to 
privileged communications that occurred during the employment relationship.86  
Sarla contended that it was thus entitled to a protective order concerning 
Raghvandaran’s deposition.87  The Infosystems court was underwhelmed by 
Sarla’s argument. 
                                                 
 79. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Alam, No. 15-10516, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100618, at *16–17 (E.D. 
Mich. June 9, 2020) (following the Peralta court’s reasoning in applying the attorney-client 
privilege to a former employee); Winthrop Res. Corp. v. CommScope, Inc. of N.C., No. 5:11-CV-
172, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158413, at *9-10 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2014) (discussing Peralta and 
concluding that it “govern[ed] the current discovery dispute”); Gioe v. AT&T, Inc., No. CV 09-
4545 (LDW) (AKT), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99066, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010) (quoting 
Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 41–42); United States ex rel. Hunt v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC, 
340 F. Supp. 2d 554, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (discussing and adopting the Peralta court’s privilege 
test for former employees). 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 99-2496 (GK), 2005 WL 8156890, 
at  *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2005) (explaining that the attorney-client privilege did not apply because 
the former employee was not, nor could have been, required to meet with the defendant’s lawyers); 
Infosystems, 197 F.R.D. at 305–06 (reasoning that the attorney-client privilege applies only where 
the former employee spoke with a lawyer at management’s direction while working for the 
organization, the former employee has a “present connection or agency relationship” with the 
organization, or the communication concerns a “confidential matter that was uniquely within the 
knowledge of the former employee when [s]he worked for the” organization). 
 81. See, e.g., Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188, 1192–94 (Wash. 2016) 
(limiting the attorney-client privilege to the duration of the employment relationship). 
 82. Infosystems, 197 F.R.D. at 306. 
 83. Id. at 304. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 305. 
 87. See id. at 304 (identifying the motions before the court). 
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Addressing Sarla’s second point first, the Infosystems court acknowledged 
that privileged communications between an employee and a company’s lawyer 
do not automatically lose their protected status when the employee leaves the 
company.88  But, that principle was irrelevant here because the subpoenaed 
materials did not encompass privileged communications that occurred while 
Raghvandaran worked at Sarla.89  With respect to Raghvandaran’s 
communications with Sarla’s lawyers concerning his activities or knowledge 
acquired during his employment with Sarla, the court reasoned that “the ruling 
in Peralta sweeps too broadly.”90 
The Infosystems court explained that in ruling as it did, the Peralta court relied 
heavily on the principles underlying the subject matter test in Upjohn and on 
Chief Justice Burger’s concurring opinion in Upjohn.91  In extending the 
attorney-client privilege to former employees, the Peralta court skipped the 
Upjohn requirement that an employee must be speaking at the direction of 
management for the privilege to apply, which Chief Justice Burger included in 
his proposed extension of the privilege to former employees.92  Absent this 
element, the Infosystems court observed, former employees do not qualify as the 
corporate lawyer’s client, they share no interest with the corporation or other 
organization in the outcome of the litigation, and their willingness to furnish 
information to the lawyer for the corporation or other organization is not directed 
by the entity’s management, but is instead purely voluntary.93  That being the 
case, it is nearly impossible to distinguish a former employee from any other 
third party who might have pertinent information about an organizational 
litigant.94 
The Infosystems court concluded that a lawyer’s “communications with a 
former employee of the client corporation generally should be treated no 
differently from communications with any other third-party fact witness.”95  To 
be sure, the court noted, “there are exceptions to this general rule.”96  For 
example, and as the court had previously observed, privileged communications 
that took place while the former employee worked for the organization do not 
lose their privileged status upon the former employee’s departure.97  There also 
may be cases where a former employee maintains an agency or consulting 
                                                 
 88. Id. at 305. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (quoting Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., No. 82 C 4585, 1985 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15457, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1985)). 
 95. Id. at 306. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (citing Valassis v. Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 124 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Peralta v. 
Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 41 (D. Conn. 1999)). 
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relationship with an organization, or where a communication between corporate 
counsel and a former employee after the former employee has left the 
corporation “concerns a confidential matter that was uniquely within the 
knowledge of the former employee when he worked for the . . . corporation,” 
such that the lawyer’s communications with the former employee “must be 
cloaked with the privilege in order for meaningful fact-gathering to occur.”98 
Because Sarla claimed the privilege, it had to demonstrate that the lawyers’ 
communications with Raghvandaran were meaningfully different from those 
“with any other third-party witness.”99  Unfortunately for Sarla, it made no such 
showing, nor did it submit the subpoenaed materials to the court for in camera 
review; rather, it simply stood on its blanket claim of privilege regarding 
Raghvandaran’s documents consistent with the holding in Peralta.100  That 
approach did not satisfy the Infosystems court, which ordered the production of 
Raghvandaran’s documents in connection with his deposition.101 
As explained earlier, the Peralta court did not overlook the Upjohn 
requirement that an employee must be speaking at the direction of management 
for the privilege to apply, which Chief Justice Burger included in his proposed 
extension of the privilege to former employees.102  On that point the Infosystems 
court was mistaken. 
The Infosystems court also too casually analogized former employees to third-
party fact witnesses.  In rejecting the control group test for the attorney-client 
privilege, the Upjohn Court recognized that employees outside the corporate 
control group could, through actions or decisions within the course and scope of 
their employment, expose the corporation to liability.103  It is for this reason that 
corporate counsel must be able to speak candidly with employees who have 
relevant knowledge of the events that gave rise to the matter at hand.104  An 
employee’s departure from the corporation does not diminish her knowledge or 
corporate counsel’s need to speak frankly with her to appropriately advise the 
corporation.  Nor does the employee’s separation from the corporation change 
                                                 
 98. Id. (citing Valassis, 143 F.R.D. at 123; Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 40; City of N.Y. v. Coastal 
Oil N.Y., Inc., No. 96 Civ. 8667 (RPP), 2000 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 1010, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2000)); 
see, e.g., Hanover Ins. Co. v. Plaquemines Parish Gov’t, No. 12-1680, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
199405, at *24–25 (E.D. La. Nov. 6, 2014) (citing Infosystems, 197 F.R.D. at 306) (upholding the 
attorney-client privilege in this context). 
 99. Infosystems, 197 F.R.D. at 306 (citing Valassis, 143 F.R.D. at 125). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 307.  The court also rejected Sarla’s claim that the documents at issue were protected 
from discovery by the work product doctrine.  Id. at 306–07. 
 102. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1981) (“Middle-level—and 
indeed lower-level—employees can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the 
corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have the 
relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with 
respect to such actual or potential difficulties.”). 
 104. Id. 
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the legal import or effect of her actions or decisions while she was still employed 
there.  On the other hand, mere third-party fact witnesses never could have 
exposed the organization to liability, and there is no need to protect their 
communications with corporate counsel as privileged.  Given that the attorney-
client privilege endorsed in Upjohn and subsequently embodied in the subject 
matter test is “a corporate privilege, not a witness privilege,” and therefore 
demands an agency or other close relationship between the corporation and the 
person from whom information is sought, it necessarily distinguishes employees 
from third-party fact witnesses.105   Extending the privilege to communications 
with former employees in specified circumstances does not alter that 
differentiation. 
D.  Rejecting the Privilege in the Former Employee Context 
The Infosystems court is not the only court to look askance at attorney-client 
privilege claims asserted with respect to communications with an organization’s 
former employees.  The Washington Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Newman 
v. Highland School District No. 203106 is the most negative decision in this line 
of authority. 
A high school football player, Matthew Newman, sued Highland School 
District No. 203 (Highland) for negligence after he sustained a serious brain 
injury during a game.107  During discovery, Newman’s lawyers deposed all of 
the football coaches on staff at the time of Newman’s injury, including coaches 
who were no longer employed by Highland.108  Highland’s lawyer stated at the 
depositions that he had previously interviewed the former coaches and that he 
was representing them at their depositions.109  After losing a battle to have 
Highland’s lawyer disqualified on conflict of interest grounds, Newman sought 
to discover the communications between Highland’s lawyer and its former 
coaches.”110  Highland moved for a protective order based on the attorney-client 
privilege which the trial court generally denied, although it did allow Highland 
to retain the privilege during the time that its lawyer represented the former 
coaches in connection with their depositions.111  The trial court otherwise 
ordered Highland to respond to Newman’s discovery requests.112  After failing 
to persuade the Washington Court of Appeals to review the trial court’s order, 
Highland won discretionary review of the order by the Washington Supreme 
Court, which ordered a temporary stay of discovery.113 
                                                 
 105. Sexton, supra note 36, at 496–97. 
 106. Newman v. Highland School District No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188 (Wash. 2016). 
 107. Id. at 1189–90. 
 108. Id. at 1190. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1191, 1191 n.1. 
 112. Id. at 1190. 
 113. Id. at 1190–91. 
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In the Washington Supreme Court, Highland argued that the flexible Upjohn 
approach to an organization’s attorney-client privilege justified extending the 
privilege to its lawyer’s post-employment communications with the former 
coaches, but the court disagreed.114  Consequently, the court affirmed the trial 
court’s denial of Highland’s motion for a protective order and re-opened 
discovery.115 
In reaching its decision, the Newman court explained that while it had 
“embraced Upjohn’s flexible approach to applying the attorney-client privilege 
in the corporate client context,” it had never analyzed whether Upjohn supported 
expanding the scope of the privilege to include counsel’s communications with 
an organization’s former non-managerial employees.116  The court reasoned that 
the “flexible approach articulated in Upjohn presupposed attorney-client 
communications taking place within the corporate employment relationship,” 
inasmuch as the privilege is intended “to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients.”117  In comparison, it made 
no sense to expand the attorney-client privilege “to communications outside the 
employer-employee relationship because former employees [are] categorically 
differ[ent] from current employees with respect to the concerns identified in 
Upjohn” and other Washington Supreme Court cases toeing the Upjohn line.118  
The court further explained the difference between current and former 
employees with respect to the privilege: 
A school district, like any organization, can act only through its 
constituents and agents.  Corporate attorney-client privilege may arise 
when “the constituents of an organizational client communicate[ ] 
with the organization’s lawyer in that person’s organizational 
capacity.”  An organizational client, including a governmental agency, 
can require its own employees to disclose facts material to their duties 
(with some limits not relevant here) to its counsel for investigatory or 
litigation purposes. 
But everything changes when employment ends.  When the employer-
employee relationship terminates, this generally terminates the agency 
relationship.  As a result, the former employee can no longer bind the 
corporation and no longer owes duties of loyalty, obedience, and 
confidentiality to the corporation.  Without an ongoing obligation 
between the former employee and employer that gives rise to a 
principal-agent relationship, a former employee is no different from 
                                                 
 114. Id. at 1191. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1192. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (referring to Youngs v. PeaceHealth, 316 P.3d 1035, 1043 (Wash. 2014)). 
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other third-party fact witnesses to a lawsuit, who may be freely 
interviewed by either party.119 
Highland argued that the court should extend the attorney-client privilege to 
its communications with the former coaches because the former coaches might 
possess vital information about the case, and that their conduct while still 
coaching in the district might open Highland to vicarious liability.120  However 
valid these concerns might be, they did not, in the Newman court’s eyes, 
rationalize stretching the attorney-client privilege beyond its underlying purpose 
of fostering full and frank communications between the lawyer and the client.121  
In the corporate or other organizational context, that purpose is achieved by 
confining the privilege to the period of the employer-employee relationship.122  
In contrast, an organization’s and a former employee’s interests may diverge 
when their employment relationship ends.123  But regardless of any relationship 
between the organization and the former employee, the privilege belongs solely 
to the organization, which alone may waive or assert its protections—even to 
the former employee’s detriment.124 
The court further reasoned that declining to extend the organizational 
attorney-client privilege articulated in Upjohn beyond the employment 
relationship would ensure “a predictable legal framework.”125  The predictability 
of the privilege’s application—which was an important consideration for the 
Upjohn court126—was especially vital in Newman, where the issue was the point 
at which the privilege ceases to apply vis-à-vis organizational clients and their 
employees.127  The Newman court observed that, while everyone “agree[s] that 
it cannot extend forever and that it cannot encompass every communication 
between corporate counsel and former employees,” it was “difficult to find any 
principled line of demarcation that extends beyond the end of the employment 
relationship.”128  Ultimately, the court decided that it could adequately protect 
the interests served by the privilege by holding that communications between 
                                                 
 119. Id. at 1192–93 (alterations in original) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
 120. Id. at 1193. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73(2) (AM. L. 
INST. 2000)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (“[I]f the purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some 
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.  An uncertain privilege, or one 
which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better 
than no privilege at all.”). 
 127. Newman, 381 P.3d at 1193. 
 128. Id. 
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lawyers for an organization and employees during the period of employment 
remain privileged after the employment relationship concludes.129 
In sum, the trial court correctly rejected Highland’s argument that its attorney-
client privilege applied equally to its lawyers’ communications with current and 
former employees.130  Highland could “assert its attorney-client privilege over 
communications with the former coaches only [while its lawyer] purportedly 
represented them at their depositions.”131 
Justice Wiggins dissented.132  He understandably reasoned that former 
employees, like current employees, may have relevant information concerning 
events that occurred during their tenure that the organization’s lawyer must 
know to appropriately advise her client.133  After all, relevant knowledge that 
employees gain while working for an organization does not become irrelevant 
merely because their employment ended.134  According to Justice Wiggins, the 
majority’s dismissal of Highland’s related argument reflected a misreading of 
Upjohn.135  Indeed, the enablement of “the flow of relevant and necessary 
information from lower-level employees to counsel” was a key reason that the 
Upjohn Court discarded the control group test and extended the attorney-client 
privilege to lawyers’ communications with mid- and low-level corporate 
employees.136 
Justice Wiggins favored the “simple test” employed by the Peralta court: “Did 
the communications with the former employee, whenever they occurred, ‘relate 
to the former employee’s conduct and knowledge, or communication with 
defendant’s counsel, during his or her employment?’”137  If they do, the 
communications are protected against disclosure by the organization’s attorney-
client privilege in accordance with Upjohn.138 
The importance of the decision in Newman is debatable.  First, the case 
articulates a clear minority rule and includes a lengthy and well-reasoned 
dissent.  Although many of the opinions upholding the privilege will not bind 
other courts, that does not change the fact that Newman is against the weight of 
the case law.139 
                                                 
 129. Id. at 1193–94. 
 130. Id. at 1194. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1194–1202 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. at 1197 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc. in Petroleum 
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1198 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (quoting Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 41 
(D. Conn. 1999)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 54. 
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Second, although the court probably discounted Upjohn’s need-to-know 
aspect too deeply, the privilege has never been held to prevent the discovery of 
facts known by an employee or former employee.140  In many cases involving 
organizational litigants—perhaps even most such cases—communications 
between the organization’s lawyer and former employees are focused on facts 
known to the former employees from their period of employment.  Thus, the 
inapplicability of the privilege to former employees under Newman is likely to 
come into play in relatively few cases. 
Third, under the inclusive Peralta test, the attorney-client privilege still 
attaches only to post-employment communications that relate to former 
employees’ conduct and knowledge, or to communication with the 
organization’s lawyers, during their employment.141  Communications between 
an organization’s lawyer and a former employee concerning events that occurred 
after the employee left the organization are not privileged.142  Similarly, if a 
lawyer informs a former employee of new facts or facts previously unknown to 
the former employee, those conversations are not privileged.143  Therefore, much 
of the back-and-forth between a lawyer and a former employee that typically 
occurs in, for example, deposition preparation, is not protected from discovery 
even in jurisdictions that are arguably more enlightened than Washington.144 
Fourth, even if the attorney-client privilege does not cloak a lawyer’s 
communications with a former employee, those communications may well be 
shielded from disclosure by the lawyer’s work product immunity.145  The 
protection afforded by work product immunity is broader than that conferred by 
the attorney-client privilege in terms of the array of information it shields from 
                                                 
 140. See SodexoMAGIC, LLC v. Drexel Univ., 291 F. Supp. 3d 681, 685 (E.D. Pa. 2018) 
(“[T]he privilege only protects communications from discovery.  Facts are discoverable, even if 
discussed in privileged communications.”); Ex parte Alfa Ins. Corp., 284 So. 3d 891, 907 (Ala. 
2019) (“[A]ttorney-client communications themselves are not discoverable.  Discovery is allowed, 
however, as to the otherwise discoverable facts that may have been included in the communications 
. . . .”); Newman, 381 P.3d at 1191 (“The attorney-client privilege does not shield facts from 
discovery, even if transmitted in communications between attorney and client.”); EPSTEIN, supra 
note 19, at 116 (“Facts remain discoverable regardless of to whom they have been conveyed.”). 
 141. Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 41. 
 142. Id. 
 143. GlobalRock Networks, Inc. v. MCI Commc’ns Servs., Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1284 
(MAD/RFT), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200814, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. May 7, 2012). 
 144. See Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 41–42 (“As to any communication between . . . counsel and a 
former employee whom counsel does not represent, which bear on or otherwise potentially affect 
the witness’s testimony, consciously or unconsciously, no attorney-client privilege applies.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Enters., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 1533 (BSJ) 
(JCF), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54154, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011) (“Although there are some 
aspects of attorney communications with former employees that are carved out of the attorney-
client privilege, many of these communications are nevertheless protected under the aegis of the 
work product doctrine.”); Gioe v. AT&T Inc., No. CV 09-4545 (LDW) (AKT), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 99066, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010) (“[T]o the extent that communications between 
[d]efense counsel and [the former employee] are specifically counsel’s conclusions or opinions, 
they may be covered by work product protection under Rule 26.”). 
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discovery.  Most obviously, work product immunity is not limited, as is the 
privilege, to confidential communications between an attorney and a client.146  
Work product immunity is not necessarily waived by the disclosure of 
confidential information to a third-party.147  Rather, for disclosure to a third-
party to waive work product protection, the third-party must be an adversary or 
a conduit to an adversary.148  Former employees generally do not fit this 
description and, thus, lawyers’ communications with them that otherwise satisfy 
the requirements for work product immunity are typically off-limits to an 
opposing party.149 
In terms of protection against discovery, tangible work product immunity is 
extraordinarily difficult to overcome.150  A lawyer’s opinion work product 
presents an even higher hurdle.  Opinion work product generally enjoys almost 
                                                 
 146. Reg’l Airport Auth. v. LFG, LLC, 460 F.3d 697, 713 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 147. See, e.g., Blattman v. Scaramellino, 891 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting this principle); 
In re Grand Jury Matter #3, 847 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2017) (waiving the attorney-client privilege 
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Excela Health, 210 A.3d 967, 979 (Pa. 2019) (“Attorney work product need be kept confidential 
only from the adversary.”). 
 148. Ayers Oil Co. v. Am. Bus. Brokers, Inc., No. 2:09 CV 02 DDN, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
111928, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 2009); O’Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 94 A.3d 299, 313 (N.J. 
2014); BouSamra, 210 A.3d at 978; State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 64 A.3d 1183, 1196 (R.I. 2013); 
Kittitas Cnty. v. Allphin, 416 P.3d 1232, 1241 (Wash. 2018). 
 149. See, e.g., Gavin v. Liberty Mut. Grp. Inc., No. 11-cv-159-LM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
109416, at *15–17 (D.N.H. Aug. 6, 2012) (ruling that a lawyer’s communications with a former 
employee were protected by the work product doctrine); Trudeau v. N.Y. State Consumer Prot. 
Bd., 237 F.R.D. 325, 338 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he exchange of [work product] with those whose 
expertise and knowledge of certain facts can help the attorney in the assessment of any aspect of 
the litigation does not invoke a waiver of the [work product] doctrine.”); Export-Import Bank of 
the U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D. 103, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Pre-deposition 
conversations may also be work product; to the extent [the plaintiff’s] attorneys communicated 
their legal opinions and theories of the case [to the former employee], their conversations are 
immune from discovery.”).  But see SEC v. Gupta, 281 F.R.D. 169, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“When 
an attorney discloses work product to prepare a non-party witness for a deposition, and that witness 
does not share a common interest with the attorney’s client, there has been a deliberate, affirmative 
and selective use of work product that waives the privilege.”). 
 150. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) (requiring a showing of “substantial need” and 
“undue hardship” to discover “documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative”). 
60 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 70.1:1 
impenetrable protection against discovery—yielding only in isolated and 
exceptional situations151—and in some states is unassailable.152 
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAWYERS 
Lawyers for corporations or other organizational clients who are grappling 
with the application of the organization’s attorney-client privilege to their 
communications with former employees must first be sure to check the 
controlling jurisdiction’s law.  If the case is in federal court on diversity 
jurisdiction grounds, the court is bound to apply the forum state’s law.153  If the 
forum state is one of the handful of states that still applies the control group test 
when evaluating organizational clients’ privilege claims, the privilege simply 
will not attach to communications with former employees.154  If the forum state 
employs the subject matter or modified subject matter test, on the other hand, 
there is hope.  Unfortunately, reported state court decisions addressing the 
                                                 
 151. Drummond Co. v. Conrad & Scherer, LLP, 885 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1422 (11th Cir. 1994)); Smith v. Scottsdale 
Ins. Co., 621 F. App’x 743, 746 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 
403 (4th Cir. 1999)); Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay, 742 F.3d 860, 869 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(quoting United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 
135 (quoting Dir., Off. of Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d 1304, 1307 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997)); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 663 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Ford 
Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 962 n.7 (3d Cir. 1997)); United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius 
Baer & Co., Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 3d 220, 223 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Dir., Off. of Thrift Supervision, 
124 F.3d at 1307); Entergy Ark., Inc., v. Francis, 549 S.W.3d 362, 371 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018). 
 152. See, e.g., Chua v. Johnson, 784 S.E.2d 449, 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (“Unlike the qualified 
privilege afforded other work product, opinion work product is entitled to an absolute privilege and 
is therefore absolutely protected from disclosure.”); TP Orthodontics, Inc. v. Kesling, 15 N.E.3d 
985, 995 (Ind. 2014) (discussing the proper interpretation of Indiana Trial Rule 26(B)(3)); Dubois 
v. Off. of the Att’y Gen., 185 A.3d 734, 741 (Me. 2018) (stating that a party is “not entitled to 
[discover] records that contain an attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
theories concerning the litigation”); State ex rel. Malashock v. Jamison, 502 S.W.3d 618, 620 (Mo. 
2016) (“The work product doctrine precludes discovery of the mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories . . . created or commissioned by counsel in preparation for possible 
litigation.”) (citing State ex rel Ford Motor Co. v. Westbrooke, 151 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Mo. 2004) 
(en banc)); Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 399 P.3d 334, 347 (Nev. 2017) (quoting 
Wardleigh v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 891 P.2d 1180, 1189 (Nev. 1995)); Henderson v. Newport 
Cnty. Reg’l YMCA, 966 A.2d 1242, 1247 (R.I. 2009) (“[O]pinion work product qualifies for 
absolute immunity from discovery and under no circumstance may another party obtain, through 
discovery methods, an attorney’s recorded thoughts and theories.”); In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 
532 S.W.3d 794, 803–04 (Tex. 2017) (stating that “[c]ore work product” is not discoverable). 
 153. See, e.g., Barr v. Ewing, 774 F. App’x 547, 551 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Because state law 
supplies the rule of decision in this case, we must apply Florida attorney-client privilege principles 
to determine whether the district court erred here.”); In re Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 736 F. App’x 392, 
394 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Because this is a diversity action involving claims for which South Carolina 
law provides the rule of decision, South Carolina’s law of attorney-client privilege applies.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Barrett Indus. Trucks, Inc. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 129 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D. 
Ill. 1990) (applying Illinois law and refusing to extend the privilege to former employees under the 
control group test). 
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privilege’s application to lawyers’ communications with organizational clients’ 
former employees are few and far between; many states have apparently not 
decided the issue.  In most diversity cases, then, lawyers will be left to argue for 
the application of the privilege based on the persuasive force of the multiple 
federal court decisions on the subject.  That said, state courts regularly look to 
well-reasoned federal decisions for guidance when deciding cases155—
especially when the state case involves issues of first impression.156  Where 
federal law controls the question, lawyers have ample authority to support a 
privilege argument,157 although many of the cases are district court decisions 
and therefore are persuasive authority rather than precedential.158 
When asserting the privilege, the lawyers for the organization must remember 
that there is no blanket privilege covering all attorney-client communications.159  
This is as true where former employees are concerned as it is anywhere else.160  
The party asserting the attorney-client privilege must establish that the privilege 
applies to each communication sought to be withheld.161  The form of the 
communication between the former employee and the lawyer is irrelevant to the 
attorney-client privilege analysis as long as the communication otherwise 
qualifies as privileged.  For example, the privilege attaches to telephone calls, 
                                                 
 155. See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Consol. Derivative Litig., 976 A.2d 872, 882 (Del. Ch. 
2009) (“In applying Delaware law, I look, as courts often do, to well-reasoned precedent from 
federal courts, courts of our sister states, and our Anglo–American jurisprudential tradition.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 798, 805 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2019) (quoting Futrell v. Payday Cal., Inc., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 524 n.6 (Ct. App. 2010)); 
Wills v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.M., 357 P.3d 453, 457 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting 
CIT Grp./Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Horizon Potash Corp., 884 P.2d 821, 823 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 157. See cases cited supra note 54. 
 158. See Vertex Surgical, Inc. v. Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D. 
Mass. 2009) (“As Judges Posner and Easterbrook have repeatedly and accurately observed, with 
characteristic bluntness, district court decisions are neither authoritative nor precedential.”); see 
also Kremers v. Coca-Cola Co., 714 F. Supp. 2d 912, 917 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (citations omitted) 
(“While the Court is perfectly well aware that . . . the opinions of district courts are not precedents, 
decisions of coordinate courts are entitled to this Court’s respectful attention and to such weight as 
their persuasive value commands.”). 
 159. In re LeFande, 919 F.3d 554, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 
1270 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 303 P.3d 1187, 1199 
(Colo. 2013) (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mr. S), 662 F.3d 65, 72 n.3 (1st Cir. 2011)); 
Maldonado v. Kiewit La. Co., 152 So. 3d 909, 927 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Cacamo v. Liberty 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 798 So. 2d 1210, 1216 (La. Ct. App. 2001)). 
 160. See, e.g., In re Morning Song Bird Food Litig., No. 3:12-cv-01592, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 198109, at *7–8 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2017) (rejecting blanket privilege assertions with 
respect to a former employee’s deposition preparation); Misner v. Potter, No. 2:07-CV-0330 TS, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136920, at *5 (D. Utah June 19, 2008) (agreeing with the “plaintiff that 
[d]efendant [could] not assert a ‘blanket privilege’” regarding communications with former 
employees). 
 161. In re Grand Jury Proc., 616 F.3d 1172, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued on June 9, 1982, 697 F.2d 277, 279 (10th Cir. 1983); In re Foster, 
188 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 1999)); Sapia v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 351 F. Supp. 3d 
1125, 1132 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Slaven v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 83 F. Supp. 3d 789, 796 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
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personal conversations, letters, notes, text messages, and e-mail messages.162  
Nonverbal communications—such as nods, shakes of the head, gestures, winks, 
and even silence—may also be privileged.163 
Lawyers must also properly perform the ministerial acts that accompany the 
assertion of the privilege.  For example, lawyers must ensure that they timely 
prepare privilege logs that satisfy local court rules lest they waive the privilege 
through their failure to comply.164  Courts’ privilege log requirements may be 
onerous.  For instance, a Kansas federal court explained that a privilege log must: 
(1) describe the document (such as an e-mail message, letter, or memorandum); 
(2) identify the date the document was prepared; (3) list the date of the document 
if it differs from the date the document was prepared; (4) identify who prepared 
the document; (5) identify the person or people for whom the document was 
prepared, as well as those to whom the document was directed; (6) state the 
purpose for which the document was prepared; (7) give the document’s length 
in page numbers; (8) state whether the document is being withheld based on the 
attorney-client privilege or work product immunity; and (9) furnish any other 
information necessary to establish the elements of the privilege or work product 
doctrine.165  With respect to element (5), the court explained that a log requires 
“an evidentiary showing based on competent evidence supporting any assertion” 
that a lawyer supervised the document’s creation.166  In connection with element 
(6), the court stated that a privilege log must include an evidentiary showing, 
based on competent evidence, that the document meets the work product 
doctrine’s anticipation of litigation requirement.167 
Regardless of whether the privilege attaches to a lawyer’s communications 
with a former employee, the lawyer should also analyze whether the 
communication enjoys work product immunity.168  “As with the attorney-client 
privilege, an assertion that a document [or other information] is protected by the 
work product doctrine must be established by specific facts and not conclusory 
statements.”169  Again, as with the privilege, the party asserting work product 
immunity bears the burden of showing that the doctrine applies to the 
information in question.170  Furthermore, documents or other information or 
materials sought to be withheld from discovery as work product must be listed 
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 165. In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Pracs. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 669, 673 (D. Kan. 2005). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Schoenmann v. FDIC, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that a 
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 169. Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., 285 F.R.D. 376, 382 (W.D. Va. 2012). 
 170. Gillespie v. Charter Commc’ns, 133 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1201 (E.D. Mo. 2015); Kannaday 
v. Ball, 292 F.R.D. 640, 644 (D. Kan. 2013). 
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and suitably described on a party’s privilege log to preserve related immunity 
claims.171 
Some lawyers for organizational litigants may be tempted to additionally 
represent former employees to create an attorney-client relationship and thereby 
shield their communications as privileged, either in connection with the former 
employees’ depositions—as the defense lawyer in Newman did—or more 
broadly.172  There is much not to like about this strategy.  First, it is not 
guaranteed to succeed.  The lawyer’s voluntary representation of a former 
employee will not shield information that does not independently qualify for 
protection under the attorney-client privilege.173  Second, the opposing party 
could argue that a claimed attorney-client relationship is a sanctionable ruse 
intended to unlawfully obstruct that party’s access to evidence.174  An argument 
along those lines may find traction with a court in some circumstances.  Third, 
and depending on the facts, a lawyer who accepts a former employee’s 
representation (even for the limited purpose of a deposition) may unwittingly 
create a concurrent conflict of interest with the lawyer’s organizational client.175  
Again depending on the facts, such a conflict of interest may or may not be 
curable by informed consent.176 
Finally, and fundamentally, lawyers should be very circumspect about what 
they say to former employees of an organizational client.  Even in jurisdictions 
that recognize the attorney-client privilege in the former employee context, the 
privilege does not attach to communications between a lawyer for the 
organization and a former employee whom the lawyer does not represent, 
“which bear on or otherwise potentially affect” the former employee’s 
testimony, whether “consciously or unconsciously.”177  Thus, and by way of 
                                                 
 171. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A)(ii). 
 172. Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188, 1190, 1194 (Wash. 2016). 
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*26–27 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2010) (quoting United States v. 22.80 Acres of Land, 107 F.R.D. 20, 25 
(N.D. Cal. 1985)) (noting that “Federal Rule of Evidence 612 renders discoverable ‘[documents] 
reviewed prior to a deposition’” and that “[a]ny privilege or work product protection against 
disclosure is deemed waived as to those portions so reviewed[,]” and ordering the production of all 
privileged documents that the witness reviewed “to refresh her recollection prior to her 
deposition”); Schaffrath v. Hamburg Twp., No. 07-14909-CV, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1354, at *4–
6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2009) (granting the plaintiff’s motion to re-depose the defendant’s former 
employee “for the purposes of inquiring into conversations he had with [d]efense [c]ounsel in 
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example, a lawyer’s efforts to refresh a former employee’s recollection before 
the former employee’s deposition likely will be discoverable.  As explained 
earlier, communications between an organization’s lawyer and a former 
employee concerning events that occurred after the employee left the 
organization are not privileged, nor are communications in which the lawyer 
informs the former employee of new facts or facts that were previously unknown 
to the former employee.178  In summary, the safest approach for lawyers is to 
assume that communications with former employees who they do not represent 
will not be privileged and proceed accordingly. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Under what may fairly be characterized as the majority approach, courts that 
apply the subject matter or modified subject matter tests when deciding whether 
a lawyer’s communications with a current employee of an organizational client 
are protected by the organization’s attorney-client privilege extend the privilege 
to communications with former employees in certain circumstances.  To be 
privileged, a communication must relate to the former employee’s conduct and 
knowledge, or communications with the organization’s lawyers, during the 
person’s employment by the organization.  In contrast, communications between 
an organization’s lawyer and a former employee about events that occurred after 
the employee left the organization are not privileged.  This is a sound approach 
that recognizes the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege while, at 
the same time, reasonably allowing opposing parties access to relevant evidence.  
For lawyers who are nonetheless concerned about the potential application of 
the privilege to their communications with former employees of their 
organizational clients, salvation may lie in the work product doctrine, which 
does not require the existence of an attorney-client relationship to protect 
information as confidential and applies to a wider array of information and 
materials.  Of course, cautious lawyers may simply assume that communications 
with former employees who they do not represent will not be privileged or 
otherwise shielded from disclosure and conduct themselves accordingly. 
                                                 
anticipation of his deposition testimony” that may have influenced his testimony, including 
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deposed”). 
 178. See supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text. 
